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I. Introduction
Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell (1961) and other academic researchers have long
propounded the benefits of dollarization and currency unions that replicate the
desirable features in welfare terms of an optimal currency area (OCA). 1,  2 In an
effort to avoid the economic turmoil associated with a volatile floating exchange
rate regime, many countries have moved toward hard-currency pegs. For example,
in recent years Ecuador and El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as their currency,
Greece joined a currency union, and Argentina, Bulgaria, and Hong Kong
implemented currency boards. In June 2003 Argentina’s President Néstor Kirchner
and Brazil’s President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva pledged to create a joint monetary
institute to work toward the creation of an eventual common currency for Mercosur.3
The idea of a common regional currency has been the subject of discussion for
many years in South America – indeed, businesses and politicians have repeatedly
called for the creation of a common currency in view of the negative economic and
political effects of severe currency crises suffered by Brazil and more recently by
Argentina (e.g., Eichengreen 1998, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2000).
From a theoretical perspective Neumeyer (1998) has proposed a general
equilibrium model of the role of money in open economies to show that a currency
union in some cases can increase welfare. Net welfare gains are possible if the
benefits from eliminating excessive volatility in the exchange and monetary markets
due to future political shocks exceed the costs of reducing the number of financial
instruments available in the economy necessary for allocational efficiency. In such
cases, excessive fluctuations in price levels due to future political shocks are
socially costly because they undermine real payoffs of nominal financial contracts,
reducing their utility as hedging instruments against shocks. Of course, a practical
1 See Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998) for a critical survey.
2 Dollarization is when a country uses a foreign currency in parallel or in place of its own
sovereign currency. The term applies not only to the use of the U.S. dollar but to other foreign
currencies also.
3 Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) is a regional cooperative organization comprised of six
LATAM countries. On March 26, 1991 the Asunción Treaty was signed by Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay, which was later ratified on November 29, 1991. The original plan was
to align the members’ external tariffs by January 1, 1995, but there was little progress toward
this goal until the signing of the Protocol of Ouro Preto in December, 1994. In recent years
Bolivia and Chile joined the common market organization as associates. Venezuela recently
joined as a regular member by political decision on December 2005.195 COMPUTING AND TESTING A STABLE COMMON CURRENCY FOR MERCOSUR COUNTRIES
issue is implementability, as determined by the existence a priori of minimum
economic incentives to justify shifting to the new monetary rule. In this regard,
anecdotal evidence would suggest that sufficient incentives exist in the Mercosur
region to support a gradual transition towards a new, more stable monetary regime.
Our main goal is to construct a feasible common currency comprised of a
basket of individual countries’ currencies for mid-sized open monetary economies
with incomplete markets in general and the Mercosur countries in particular. To
our knowledge no previous studies propose a methodology for computing and
testing a feasible common currency. As a theoretical framework, we adopt an
intertemporally separable overlapping generations (ISOLG) version of Neumeyer’s
(1998) general equilibrium approach with incomplete markets (GEI). In this context
the ideal security is defined as the common currency insulated from future political
shocks yet capable of completing the markets dynamically.4,  5 We show that a
feasible ideal common currency can be computed by employing stable aggregate
currency (SAC) methods recently developed by Hovanov et al. (2004). As such,
our paper extends their work on major currencies of large, industrialized countries
to mid-sized, open monetary economies with incomplete markets. More specifically,
we construct the common currency as a minimum variance currency basket
containing optimally-weighted amounts of the currencies of Mercosur countries.
This optimal currency basket could be used to issue a single, common currency to
which its value could be tied.
We demonstrate the computation of a common currency for Mercosur via
simulation following Schmukler and Servén’s (2001) broad interest rate parity
decomposition of each member country’s nominal exchange risk. The proposed
common currency can be viewed as a derivative of an underlying dynamic hedging
portfolio of securities that proxies the nominal exchange rate risk factors of a given
set of currencies and floats against the rest of the world’s currencies. The probability
of currency depreciation is assumed to be determined endogenously in a second-
generation escape clause model as in Jeanne and Masson (2000). Following the
standard procedure in the second-generation literature of currency crisis, currency
and country risk factors are modeled as a Markov-switching process. Our empirical
4 Following the incomplete markets literature, an ideal security offers the best trade-off
between risk reduction and an increase in the mean return among all income streams available
in the marketed subspace of assets (e.g., see Magill and Quinzii 1998).
5 Any equilibrium allocation can be reproduced with at least H < S currencies, where H is the
number of different types of agents, and S is the number of possible future states of nature
(Geanakoplos et al. 1987, Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell 1989, and Talmain 1999). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 196
results show that the implied Mercosur SAC satisfies the desired properties of an
ideal common currency.
Finally, we assess the willingness of individual Mercosur countries to participate
in the monetary union by comparing the stability of the implied Mercosur SAC to
that of the individual Mercosur country currencies. In this regard, our results are
consistent with Eichengreen (1998), who conjectured that sufficient incentives
exist in Mercosur to adopt a monetary union. Because our model stresses the
financial sector of the economy, this study constitutes a first step towards a more
complete and comprehensive economic analysis of the costs and benefits of
adopting a common currency in Mercosur.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the
OCA literature. Section III overviews theory and proposes a feasible common
currency based on theoretical work by Neumeyer (1998) and analytical methods
by Hovanov et al. (2004). Section IV describes the empirical methodology. Section
V reports the estimation results and discusses their interpretation. Section VI
concludes.
II. Literature review
For an excellent recent survey of the OCA literature, we refer the reader to Mongelli
(2002). During the pioneering phase from 1960 to 1970, the desirable OCA properties
were identified in terms of convergence of prices, as well as more diversification in
production, consumption, and trade. The main difficulty with this initial phase is
the lack of a unifying theoretical framework and, consequently, clear empirical
approach. During the 1970s, a second set of theoretical contributions developed a
meta-property (i.e., symmetry of real shocks) providing new insights in the analysis
of the costs and benefits of adopting an OCA. With the slowdown in the process
of the European monetary union (EMU), the development of a unifying theory lost
momentum. In this period the discussion shifted to consideration of the benefits
and costs of adopting a currency union. As such, the old OCA properties were
reinterpreted leading to a new theory of optimum currency area. During the second
half of the 1980s, the European report “One Market, One Money” extended the
elements of the new theory of OCA to the desirable institutional features of the
EMU. The current phase is empirical for the most part.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the welfare effects of a common currency
is mixed. For example, Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose (2001) have argued that
monetary unions could become optimal ex post, even though individual countries197 COMPUTING AND TESTING A STABLE COMMON CURRENCY FOR MERCOSUR COUNTRIES
do not meet the optimality criteria ex ante. These and other studies are backward
looking and do not reflect a switch in policy regime. Thus, a crucial question is
what type of expectations and forces might the monetary unification unleash?  In
this regard, two distinct paradigms can be distinguished – endogeneity versus
specialization – with different implications in terms of benefits and costs.
The basic intuition of the endogeneity OCA hypothesis is that monetary
integration reduces trading costs beyond exchange rate volatility. For example,
Eichengreen (1998) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) concluded that,
although Mercosur is far from having ex ante the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a monetary union, its long-term ex post effects in terms of credibility gains
could be potentially significant. Importantly, it could be a symbol of political and
institutional commitment between countries (e.g., see Mussa 1997 and Cooper and
Kempf 2000).
Krugman’s specialization hypothesis postulates that, as geographical areas
become more integrated, specialization in the production of those goods with
comparative advantage results in net welfare gains. One problem with this argument
is that specialization also entails vulnerability to exogenous supply shocks. In this
respect Eichengreen (1994) contended that, in the presence of asymmetric real
shocks, the case for a common currency union is significantly weakened (i.e., the
cost of losing direct control over the monetary policy may be too high to obtain
net welfare gains).
III. Common currency theory
This section overviews an intertemporally separable overlapping generations
(ISOLG) version of Neumeyer’s (1998) general equilibrium model. Due to its ability
to capture complex dynamics in a parsimonious setting, the overlapping generation
model is well suited to our problem of developing a stable common currency for
Mercosur countries. In this regard, we should note that overlapping generations
and cash-in-advance economies are equivalent in most respects (see Huo 1987).
After a brief statement of the main theoretical assumptions, the concept of a feasible
ideal common currency is formally proposed.
A. Mathematical preliminaries
Consider the following two-dated uncertain OLG exchange world economy with
one perishable consumption good and H É Ht ³ 1 non-atomic intertemporal traders JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 198
per generation, indexed in the interval [0, h], where Ht  is the subset corresponding
to each country i (or common purchasing power spatial unit) such that i Î  I =
í1,…, Iý. In each period t there are 2Ht traders alive representing each country’s
young and old cohorts. Every young-age trader knows her present (state 0)
endowment but faces at date 1 one of many S possible states of nature with
respect to the realization of her old-age endowment with probability p(s). Let the
history of the economy at time t be summarized by the sequence ht º [ s1,…, st ],
where sc e S is the realization of the state of nature in period t. Each of the states at
date 1 is determined by the realization of two types of shocks:  1) a set S>1 of
economic factors (fundamentals) associated with the realization of each traders’
endowment (i.e., intrinsic uncertainty); and 2) a set of  1 I Q=Q ´ ´Q L political
factors (sunspots) generated in country i that influences monetary policy in country
j (i.e., extrinsic uncertainty including the possibility of financial contagion i¹ j).
Thus, the state space of the economy is equal to {} 0 S=å´ Q U , with s = (s,q ) for
every s Î S and q ÎQ. Note that both sources of uncertainty are not necessarily
independent. What matters for our analysis is the possibility of multiple rational
expectations equilibria despite no intrinsic uncertainty. If these beliefs are shared
by everyone, then price randomness may be self-fulfilling and will not necessarily
dissipate even asymptotically, thereby leading to complex dynamics and periodic
equilibria.
Assume that all traders have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
represented by the following linear-quadratic functional:6
() () () () ()
2 1
0
1
,0
2
S hh h h h h h
ss h
sS
xU u x s u m x s x s pa
+
++
Î
éù ìü éù éù "Î Â = + - íý êú ëû ëû îþ ëû å
rr r
,
where  () 10
h
hs hH mw s a
Î -> å for all s Î S in order to preserve the usual
neoclassical properties of monotonicity, quasi-concavity, and C-differentiability,
with  h a denoting the idiosyncratic component,  ()
2 h ws ++ ÎÂ is the endowment
vector of the generic trader h conditional on the state s, ms is the common (income)
component of the utility function, and  ()
h xs
r
is the trader h excess demand
conditional on the state s.
Suppose that at time t the generic trader h born under ht has access to J long-
lived securities that are traded in the world financial markets — in particular, an
6 Despite the well-known undesirable features of linear-quadratic preferences, they have the
advantage of placing our model under the general framework of the well-known Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) of financial economics, so that a closed-form with an equilibrium that
has simple geometric properties can be attained.
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indexed bond that pays a unit of the consumption bundle in every state (the
nominal riskless asset), and a (risky) nominal bond denominated in each of the I
fiat monies.7,  8 Define the matrix  () 1
SJ
j Ap s + éù ÎÂ ëû , and let  () 0, jj j pp p éù º ëû % be
the general price level in currency j, where  () 1 ,,
S
jS pp p ºÎ Â % K is its uncertain
component. Assuming no Ponzi schemes, a consumption plan is feasible if and
only if it can be financed by a portfolio of financial assets holdings 
hJ y ÎÂ with
payoff matrix A. Provided that the matrix A has full column rank, there is a one-to-
one relation between each attainable consumption allocation and asset portfolio.
If traders are allowed to hold money, bonds, and goods of either country without
restrictions (i.e., zero trading frictions), have identical preferences and constant
foreign marginal costs (normalized to unity), then the optimal behavior of each
trader only depends on the vector of prices p that holds worldwide. That is, a priori
the law of one price holds worldwide for each state s and trader h such that:
() ,, , 0 jk i j k i for every i j and k q q x =
{} () () ,, 0 , () ji j i for every i j and s S p s s p s x Î= U
where  () ij s x is the nominal exchange rate of currency i in terms of currency j, and
jk q is the price of the asset k in currency j. In brief, for the generic trader h the
budget set constraint is:
()() ()
,, :
hh h S J h hh q
Bp q xy x w y
Ap
++
ìü - æö ïï =Î Â ´ Â - = ç÷ íý
ïï èø îþ
.
The ISOLG economy specified so far is a member of the class of canonical
general equilibrium Arrow-Debreu economies with incomplete markets (GEI)
(Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1984). Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) define a
perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) of the GEI as the tuple  () () ,, ,
hh
hH pq x y
Î such
that the consumption allocations are attainable by transacting in the financial
markets – for each trader h the consumption allocations are optimal within the set
of all feasible consumption allocations, all markets clear, and a priori the law of one
7 According to the incomplete markets literature, a long-lived security is defined as a security
that can be traded in every period (see Magill and Quinzii 1998, and Talmain 1999).
8 As pointed out by Neumeyer (1998), this scheme implicitly contemplates the existence of
future contracts on the foreign exchange.
(2)
(3)
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price holds worldwide. Let  () () ,, ,
hh
hH pq x y
Î be a PFE and preferences as in
equation (1). Suppose that in equilibrium  () ;
hh xx s S =Î %% . Then an ideal security
g  is the one that satisfies  ()
hh
ss s Du x I g ´= % for each sS Îand trader h
(Geanakoplos and Shubik 1990).9
Note that, when evaluated in real terms, the matrix  () Ap
* is contingent on
whatever determines the value of money (Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell 1989). It is
now apparent that monetary policy has real effects because the price level determi-
nes the position of the market subspace. This gives rise to the well-known problem
of indeterminacy of the nominal exchange rate in equilibrium, which has been
extensively examined in the OLG literature (e.g., Kareken and Wallace 1981, Siconolfi
1991, King et al. 1992, and Barnett 1992).1 Under these conditions, a fixed exchange
rate is considered socially desirable if excessive price level volatility is eliminated.
Furthermore, Cooper and Kempf (2001) have shown that, in a seignoriage game
between governments, positive inflation is the dominant strategy. Hence, there is
an incentive for the government to deviate from any pre-announced commitment
rule. Consequently, in a world of forward looking agents, the ideal common currency
should also constitute a symbol of political and institutional commitment between
countries.
B. A feasible ideal common currency
Neumeyer (1998, pp. 256-257) shows that any monetary policy subject to
political shocks supports an equilibrium that is Pareto inferior to the one
corresponding to a monetary policy without such shocks. Let
() () () {}
1
1, ii MS M
q pq s sq
-
éù = ëû å be the quantity of money issued by the
government of country i in the hypothetical scenario that the monetary policy is
made independent of political shocks, with  1 ,,
s
i MMM éù =Î Â ëû Kthe vector of
monetary policies in all the I countries. From Neumeyer (1998) we know that, when
() () cov 1 , 1 0 ij pp éù = ëû for all i, j, the welfare gain of eliminating future political
shocks reduces to:
9 Because of the homogeneity property in equation (1), this asset is ideal by definition. Moreover,
by duality, this asset gives the cheapest possible bundle given the price vector prevailing in each
state and what is available in the economy at each point in time, rather than some fixed
consumption bundle.
10 The indeterminacy problem arises when each of local stationary sunspot equilibria corresponds
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, (5)
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2
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var var
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i ii
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where  h u denotes the utility under  M ,  h u the utility in equilibrium, and
11
hh ew H w =- is a measure of heterogeneity across traders with  1 wH denoting
the average world output for all h. If there is an ideal currency with constant price
equal to one, then  ii wM is the exchange rate between currency i and this
benchmark currency, and  () var ii wM s éù ëû is the ith currency excess exchange
rate volatility. Talmain (1999) also shows that, when the number of currencies is
reduced to  HS <, any allocation that could have been supported under a Pareto
superior market structure can still be supported with only H currencies as long as
the initial aggregate stocks of currencies are not identical to zero.
By assuming only the law of one price and non-arbitrage conditions, the
intertemporal trader’s decision problem in our CAPM economy can be reduced to
a search process for the lower volatility bound of the stochastic discount factor
(Hansen and Jagannathan 1991). We consider the minimum-variance, multi-currency
numeraire developed by Hovanov, Kolari, and Sokolov (2004). These authors show
how to compute a currency invariant value of an individual currency. By dividing
the exchange rate for a currency by the geometric mean of a basket of currencies,
the value of any currency is shown to be the same regardless of the base currency
chosen. For example, the value of the U.S. dollar can be computed using any base
currency (e.g., British pounds sterling, Japanese yen, etc.). The normalized value
of a currency is useful in comparing the volatility of individual currencies and
basket of currencies. It also permits the computation of a unique optimal, minimum-
variance currency basket (i.e., dubbed SAC for stable aggregate currency) regardless
of base currency choice. Using the same five hard currencies as contained in the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket currency,
these authors demonstrated that SAC has a standard deviation over the period
1981-1998 that is more than 10 times smaller than the SDR and about 40 times more
stable than the U.S. dollar. Due to its stability over time, SAC is a potential candidate
for the ideal common currency.
Let the currency basket be expressed as
() [] [] {} 11 1 ,, ,, II I AC M M M u M u = KK , with value
() [] () () ()
11
;;
jj
ii i i j j
ii
Val AC M t M Val u t M t Val u x
==
æö
éù éù == ç÷ ëû ëû
èø åå
, following
notation in Hovanov et al. (2004). After some manipulation: JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 202
()
()
()
() ()
0
0
1 1 0
;
;
I I
ij
i ii
i i ij
Val AC M t t
zR N V a l tt
t Val AC M t
x
x = =
éù ëû =
éù ëû
å Õ              (6)
where   () 0 i RNVal t t  for  all  i = 1,…,I and all t = 1,…,T  is the reduced (to one at
t = 0)  normalized value in exchange, and  ()
()
0
0 1
ii j
i I
ii j i
Mt
z
Mt
x
x
=
=
å
is the vector of non-
negative weights. This normalized value of any particular currency (or currency
basket) is invariant to base currency choice (i.e., valuing the dollar in terms of yen
or pounds or other currencies yields the same index dollar value). We employ the
currency invariant value of the ith currency, or  () 0 i RNVal t t , to later compare the
values and volatility of Mercosur currencies (and a Mercosur currency basket)
over time.
Given the exchange rate time series  () t ij x for all  j i ¹ and fixed sample period
[] T , 1 , the minimum variance currency basket (MVCB) AC(M*)  for a fixed set of
monies is calculated by searching the optimal weight vector z* that solves the
following optimal control problem:
( ) () () , , cov 2 , cov var
11 ,
2 2
1 , ï
ï
þ
ï
ï
ý
ü
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
í
ì
+ = = åå å
=
<
= =
Â Î + +
I
i
I
j i
j i
j i i i
I
j i
j i
z
j i z z s w j i z z z Min
such that  0 ³ i z for all  I i , , 1K = and å
Î
=
I i
i z 1, where  () j i , cov denotes the covariance
between  () 0 t t RNVali for all  () 0 t t RNValj and  2
i s denotes the variance of  () 0 t t RNVali
for all  I j i , , 1 , K = and all  T t , , 1K = . We utilize this procedure to compute an optimal,
stable aggregate currency (SAC) for Mercosur that can be used as the ideal common
currency.
Proposition 1:  Given a GEI economy with PFE, let the measure of gain in welfare
be defined as in equation (5). Then for each trader h solving the optimal control
problem in equation (7)  ( ) * * = M AC AC  is an ideal (Pareto efficient) security.
Proof:  It follows immediately from our previous analysis. Q.E.D.
IV. Empirical methodology
In this section we describe the empirical methodology used to construct SAC for
three of the Mercosur countries (i.e., Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) and one
associate country (i.e., Chile). We do not include Paraguay (a member) and Bolivia
(an associate) because of data limitations. The analysis starts by computing the
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SAC for the two biggest economies of Mercosur: Argentina and Brazil. Then we
add the other member Uruguay and associate country Chile. This procedure permits
us to answer the following question: if the Mercosur countries decide to build a
stable basket currency, does the stability of the basket increase with the number of
countries included in the basket?11  The sample period covers the major financial
crises of the 1990s and early 2000s (including Argentina’s technical default). Details
of the dataset are presented in the Appendix. Summary statistics are presented in
Table 1.
One problem that we face in constructing SAC for Mercosur countries is that
some currencies were floating and others pegged during the sample period. Also,
different exchange rate regimes were used by some countries over time.
Consequently, we seek to construct a time series of implicit exchange rates that
reflect the risk factors involved in the currencies. For this purpose we follow
Schmukler and Servén’s (2001) broad version of interest rate parity, in which the
change in the forward exchange rate can be expressed as:
, , , , t t t j t i t f premium country premium currency i i m + = - =
where
, ) ( , j i e s e premium currency t ij t ij t ¹ " + D =
country premiumt = EMBIt + onshore premiumt,  ,
t ij e , D denotes the expected depreciation of currency i with respect to currency j,
t e s ) ( is the exchange risk premium for currency i in terms of currency j (i.e., the
compensation demanded by risk averse investors due to innovations in exchange
rate), and the ith country premium is decomposed into a pure sovereign default
premium (proxied by some sovereign bond equivalent yield, or EMBIt) and the
onshore premium or liquidity cost (i.e., Engel’s 1992 risk and liquidity premiums,
respectively). The onshore premium reflects the risk and cost derived from shifting
assets across jurisdictions. Conceptually, the total differential between interest
rates on domestic-currency loans issued by domestic borrowers and those on
foreign-currency loans issued by foreign borrowers reflects both currency and
country risk premia. The latter refers to the gap between borrowing costs of domestic
and foreign borrowers in a common currency because of the jurisdiction of issue.
11 We thank an anonymous referee for this recommendation.
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The former refers to the gap between the domestic-currency and foreign-currency
interest rates faced by a given borrower because of currency denomination.
Consistent with the escape clause models literature (see Jeanne and Mason
2000 for details), we use a regime-switching E-GARCH model to estimate the variance-
covariance matrix  å for both the currency and country risk components of the
implied exchange rate. This model can be generally written as the following AR(q)
process (Hamilton and Susmel 1994, Susmel 2000, and Klaassen 2002):12
() t t t v x f e + = b with  () , , 0 ~ 1 t t t h D v- Y
() () [] t t t t t i t i t
q
i
i t s h E s u s u a h 1 1
2
1
2
1
ln ln - - - - -
=
+ + =å s m s with () , 2 1
t t t t h s u e s =
where  () b t x f denotes the mean dynamics of the stochastic process,  t x denotes
the vector of M explanatory variables, including the order-q lagged values of the
dependent variable,  b  is an M x 1 vector of parameters,  1 - Yt is the information set
at time t – 1, v is the error term which follows some conditional distribution on  1 - Yt ,
and  () . 1 , 0 . . . ~ d i i t e  The conditional errors have zero mean and a time-varying variance
ht, which follows a general regime-switching E-GARCH (K,q) process with K given
states and q autoregressive lags.13  The terms s2, a’s, and m are the regime shift,
autoregressive, and asymmetric scale parameters of the GARCH structure,
respectively, with the state variable st described by the following Markov chain:
() y y s i s j s t t t t t , , , , 1 , Pr 2 1 2 1 K K = = = = - - - -
Since st is a hidden layer, the best way to make an optimal inference about the
current regime of the observed process is through the implementation of Hamilton’s
(1989, 1990) nonlinear expectation maximization (EM) algorithm.
12 The autocorrelation coefficient allows for the nonsynchronous trading effect in the market
instruments that make up the currency invariant index.
13 As shown by Klaassen (2002), this approach has the advantage over the E-SWARCH model
that it is nested in the general class of GARCH models.
(11)
(12)
() K j i p i s j s ij t t , , 2 , 1 , Pr 1 K = " = = = = -
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With the key output variables parameterized as regime-switching RS/E-GARCH
(K,q) processes, the final step in the empirical construction of an implied SAC is to
simulate different price paths for the variables solving simultaneously the stochastic
optimal control problem in equation (7) via a structured Quasi-Monte Carlo
numerical approach.14  The controls are the weights of the ex ante misalignments
of the implied exchange rates calculated as the log difference of the total exchange
risk and its geometric mean. The implied forex series (per U.S.dollar due to measuring
interest rates and sovereign debt yields in dollar terms) are simulated by limiting
the correlation effects to the country risk component of the total exchange rate
risk. The intra-temporal correlation matrix is obtained from the residuals of the RS/
E-GARCH estimates. The inter-temporal correlations are recovered from the AR
component of the GARCH structure. The jumps between high and low volatility
regimes are approximated by a binomial distribution.
V. Empirical results and discussion
First, we present stylized facts. Following work by Engel and Hamilton (1990) on
exchange rates, our starting point is to test the null hypothesis of a unit root with
drift versus the alternative hypothesis of nonlinear trend stationarity (or segmented
trends). For this purpose we use Bierens’ NLADF test on the eight time series (i.e.,
the currency and country risk premiums for each of the four countries). In order to
correct for the size distortion problem, we progressively increase the order of the
AR(q) term in the Chebychev polynomial of the ADF regression. Also, to improve
the power of the NLADF test, we simulate the p-values. In unreported results we
find support for Engel and Hamilton’s (1990) “long swings” hypothesis.
Tables 2 and 3 provide the best econometric specification for the currency risk
and country risk factors. Consistent with the nonlinear trend stationary hypothesis,
the presence of a switching structure in the mean of the conditional variance
equation reduces the significance of the GARCH effect. Figure 1 plots the smoothed
transition probabilities of visiting the high probability regime of a currency
depreciation. Figure 2 plots the smoothed transition probabilities of visiting the
14 Because the standard Monte Carlo method asymptotically becomes a deterministic quadra-
ture scheme (see e.g., Judd 1998), we use a sampling technique known as Latin square or Latin
hypercube to generate sub-random number sequences to fill more uniformly the exceedingly
sparse n-dimensional space at a very low computational cost. Optimal control problems of the
type at hand are known to be NP-hard, especially if the deterministic component is assumed to
be highly nonlinear and the number of variables under analysis is very large. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 208
0 a   0.0906    [0.6100]  -0.3203
   [0.2540]  0.0088 [0.9640]  -0.4028*[0.0810] 
SE [0.1773]  [0.2791]  [0.1961]  [0.2288] 
f   0.0792**[0.0000] 0.0043**[0.0000]    -0.1085[0.5020]  -0.0971*[0.0510] 
SE [0.0076]  [0.0000]  [0.1610]  [0.0493] 
() 1
2 s   0.9439**  10.0525**     2.5031**  1.2496**   
SE [0.3117]  [1.7464]  [0.4140]  [0.2118] 
() 2
2 s   6.2487** 5.7430** 0.6554**  5.9564** 
SE [0.9048]  [0.7314]  [0.2511]  [0.4788] 
1 a  1.1580** [0.0000]  1.1036*  [0.0690]  0.1521 [0.5830]  0.2274
  [0.2950] 
SE  [0.1987]  [0.6013]  [0.2767]      [0.2162] 
m   0.2381**[0.0020] -0.6718**[0.0000]  0.9826
   [0.7660]  0.4136
   [0.4900] 
SE [0.0776]  [0.0727]  [3.2952]  [0.5975]     
p(1,1) 0.9731  0.8632  0.9219  0.9423 
p(2,2) 0.8531  0.9354  0.9468  0.7294 
Log - likelihood  -271.8190  -351.3990  -228.7580  -278.3920 
Distribution Student-t Student-t Normal  Student-t 
Jarque - Bera test  19.8424  [0.0000]  9239.27  [0.0000]  1.3883 [0.4990]  198.3450[0.0000] 
Ljung-Box Q(12) -e   15.3819  [0.2210]  41.5294  [0.0000]  34.2541[0.0000]  8.2810    [0.7620] 
Ljung-Box Q(12)-
2 e   19.1741  [0.0840]  14.7344  [0.2560]  10.6987[0.5540]  0.8059    [0.9990] 
LM-test  1.6242    [0.2020]  0.0774   [0.7800]  1.8985  [0.1680]  1.3139    [0.2510] 
high sovereign’s debt default risk regime. We find a statistically significant
asymmetric GJR-type effect of (negative) news concerning the conditional volatility
of the currency factor risks in Argentina and Brazil. During the sample period, the
results also suggest that, besides market integration, Mercosur countries were
subject to some form of financial contagion.
Table 2. Quasi-maximum likelihood estimates for the currency risk premiums
t t t v y y + D + = D -1 0 f a ,  () t t t h D v , 0 ~ 1 - Y
() () [] t t t t t i t i t
q
i
i t s h E s u s u a h 1 1
2
1
2
1
ln ln - - - - -
=
+ + =å s m s ,  () t t t t h s u e s
2 1 = , and  () t t t t h s u e s
2 1 =
Notes: This table reports the quasi-maximum likelihood estimates of a regime-switching E-GARCH (2,1)
model for the currency risk factors for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The sample period is 01/
1994 to 06/2002. Asymptotic standard errors (SE) are in brackets below the parameter estimates. The
pvalues are shown in brackets beside the parameter estimates. The CM test follows a c1 with null H0
nonlinear functional form is adequate for the DGP. Distribution denotes the distribution of the conditional
errors. The Jarque-Bera normality test follows a c2. The Ljung-Box autocorrelation tests follows a c11.
Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ** 5% level and * 10% level.
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Table 3. Quasi-maximum likelihood estimates for the country risk premiums
t t t v y y + D + = D -1 0 f a ,  () t t t h D v , 0 ~ 1 - Y
() () [] t t t t t i t i t
q
i
i t s h E s u s u a h 1 1
2
1
2
1
ln ln - - - - -
=
+ + =å s m s ,  () t t t t h s u e s
2 1 = , and  () 1 , 0 . . . ~ d i i t e
Argentina        Brazil          Chile         Uruguay
0 a   -11.0222[0.3980] -11.4515[0.2500] -5.1214**[0.0400]  0.8851  [0.8000] 
SE [12.9968]  [9.9115]  [2.4647]  [3.4930] 
f   -0.0203   [0.9020]  -0.1214  [0.3030]   -0.0288    [0.8260]  -0.0123 [0.9520] 
SE  [0.1647] [0.1172] [0.1309]  [0.2068] 
() 1
2 s   12.2485**     8.8446**      8.2741    6.63214** 
SE  [0.8871] [0.7115] [0.4991]       [0.3447] 
() 2
2 s   8.8913** 11.0591**  5.7993  6.63214** 
SE  [0.7075] [0.5198] [0.3546]  [0.3447] 
1 a   0.3557   [0.2420]  -0.2019  [0.4010]  0.1371     [0.5460]  0.5299  [0.2370] 
SE  [0.3023] [0.2396] [0.2263]  [0.4452] 
m   -0.2392  [0.6930]  -0.2202  [0.7640]  -0.0304    [0.9870]  -0.6673 [0.4370] 
SE  [0.6055] [0.7323] [1.8810]  [0.8552] 
p(1,1)  0.8449 0.9409 0.9465  NA 
p(2,2)  0.9406 0.9564 0.9660  NA 
Log  –  likelihood  -608.7450 -641.6540 -488.8570  -439.9130 
Distribution Student-t Student-t Student-t Student-t 
Jarque - Bera test  20.2798  [0.0000]  20.9457  [0.0000]  45.2515   [0.0000]  31.6137  [0.0000]
Ljung-Box Q(12) - e   7.9413    [0.7890]  8.9431    [0.7070]  7.7037     [0.8070]  16.5830  [0.1650]
Ljung-Box Q(12)-
2 e   16.1759  [0.2310]  10.8888  [0.5380]  18.8472   [0.0920]  5.3175    [0.9460]
CM-test  0.7683    [0.3800]  0.0424    [0.8360]  1.8985     [0.1680]  0.5008    [0.4790]
Notes: This table reports the quasi-maximum likelihood estimates of a regime-switching E-GARCH (2,1)
model for the currency risk factors for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The sample period is 01/
1994 to 06/2002. Asymptotic standard errors (SE) are in brackets below the parameter estimates. The
pvalues are shown in brackets beside the parameter estimates. The CM test follows a c
1 with null H
0:
nonlinear functional form is adequate for the DGP. Distribution denotes the distribution of the conditional
errors. The Jarque-Bera normality test follows a c2. The Ljung-Box autocorrelation tests follows a c11.
Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ** 5% level and * 10% level. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 210
Figure 1. Transition probabilities of being in the high regime of expected
probability of depreciation of the local currency for each Mercosur country
(excluding Uruguay)
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Figure 2. Transition probabilities of being in the high regime of expected
probability of technical default of its sovereign debt for each Mercosur
country (excluding Uruguay)
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Concerning financial contagion, the Tequila crisis of 1994 was a major event for
all the Mercosur countries but did not culminate in a regional crisis. Brazil was the
Mercosur country most affected by the Asian crisis of 1997. Interestingly, although
sharing with Hong Kong a pseudo-currency board exchange rate regime, the Asian
shock did not end with a depreciation of the peso in Argentina (see Galiani et al.
2003). Chile and Brazil were the most affected Mercosur countries by the Russian
crisis of 1998 (Baig and Goldfajn 2000), but Chile’s floating exchange rate regime
contained this shock to some extent (Morandé 2001). By contrast, Brazil eventually
abandoned the crawling peg regime in 1999. A striking fact is that the Brazilian
crisis of 1999 had no major contemporaneous effect on Argentina, its major trading
partner. But as explained by Galiani et al. (2003), it did have a major effect on
Argentina’s large deflation-cum-adjustment process that ended with the collapse
of the pseudo-currency board exchange regime. Uruguay and Brazil exhibited some
degree of financial instability after Argentina’s default on its sovereign debt, but
these countries seldom experienced currency crises due to international financial
support (Edwards 2000).
Table 4 presents the main results of the paper. The resulting optimal country
weights for the implied SAC are statistically significant and fairly symmetrical with
relatively equal weight (i.e., 21.87% Argentinean pesos, 27.48% Brazilian reals,
27.41% Chilean pesos, and 23.25% Uruguayan pesos).15 In actual currencies the
Mercosur SAC contains 3.272 Argentinean pesos, 0.530 Brazilian reals, 4.083
Chilean pesos, and 2.114 Uruguay pesos, which can be divided proportionately to
define a unit SAC. This currency basket would stay the same over time regardless
of changes in exchange rates.
Although from a political institutional point of view the results are somewhat
counterintuitive, recall that our model focuses on the financial economy. In this
regard, Brazil’s weight reflects its incremental risk to the group, rather than its
economic importance as measured for example by GDP. For political and economic
reasons the weight on the Brazilian real could be increased, but this change likely
would increase the instability of the Mercosur SAC. The results shown at the end
of Table 4 parallel those of financial economics with respect to the benefits of
stock portfolio diversification. For example, including Uruguay to a basket currency
already containing Argentina and Brazil represents a 50.53% reduction in the
portfolio’s risk in terms of reducing the standard deviation of the normalized
currency basket value. Adding Chile to the 3-country basket represents a further
33.34% risk (or standard deviation) reduction. However, in unreported results the
15 This result is qualitatively similar independently of the number of countries included in the
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incremental gains in risk reduction as the number of countries increases may have
some lower threshold representing pure (regional) non-diversifiable systematic
risk.
These results raise some interesting insights about the implementation of the
common currency. First, it is clear that, by assuming that the common currency’s
value is tied to the optimal currency basket, increasing the number of countries in
a common currency tends to increase its stability. In this regard, Venezuela recently
has been admitted as a member to Mercosur and the inclusion of the bolivar would
likely further increase the stability of a Mersocur SAC to some extent. Second, our
Table 4. Results for the implied Mercosur SAC
Notes: This table reports the results for the stable aggregate currency (SAC) for Mercosur
using the Hovanov, Kolari, and Sokolov (2004) procedure. The implied exchange rate
series for each country are calculated using the regime-switching E-GARCH estimates
presented in Tables 2 and 3. For comparative analysis we also include the statistical
moments of a hard currency SAC using the same currencies as in Hovanov et al.(2004).
At the end of the table, we include the average incremental percentage risk reduction
upon adding one-by-one the countries included in the analysis starting with a 2-country
basket between Argentina and Brazil.
  Implied 
Mercosur 
SAC 
Hard 
Currency 
SAC 
RNVal 
Argentin
a 
RNVal 
Brazil 
RNVal 
Chile 
RNVal 
Uruguay 
Mean  0.9936  0.9998 1.1131  1.0426 0.9974 0.9461 
Standard deviation  0.0120  0.0013  0.3062  0.3031  0.1381  0.1146 
Coefficient of variation  1.2080  0.1333  27.5044  29.0699  13.8448  12.1142 
Minimum  0.9358  0.9980 0.5926  0.4682 0.6434 0.6616 
Maximum  1.0168  1.0031 3.1565  2.0511 1.3734 1.2469 
Prob.£0.80  0.00% 0.00%  12.57%  22.16%  5.69%  8.67% 
Prob.£1.00  70.75%  59.41% 41.64%  51.36% 56.17% 68.98% 
Prob.³1.10  0.00%  0.00% 45.93%  34.31%  21.97% 8.31% 
Implied Mercosur 
  SAC weights 
   21.87%  27.48%  27.41%  23.25% 
Mercosur SAC  
  in countries’  
  currencies 
  
3.273 
pesos 
0.530 
reals 
4.083 
pesos 
2.114 
pesos 
  From a 
2-country 
basket to a 
3-country 
basket 
From a 
3-country 
basket to a 
4-country 
basket 
     
Incremental risk 
reduction  50.53% 33.34%       
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results suggest that the common currency could be subject to a symmetric-collective
control within the agency in charge of the regional monetary policy. Third, and
last, the inclusion of a member in the monetary union could be done following pure
real economic considerations as dictated by OCA theory even if diversification
benefits in terms of improving common currency stability have reached a limit.
Although the success of the new institution relative to old ones cannot be
guaranteed a priori from our simple exercise, we believe that SAC could provide a
device that fosters cooperation and the implementation of necessary reforms
(otherwise not possible for each individual country) enforced by a regional monetary
authority. Regarding the use of SAC as a common currency, we should be careful
to note that, as is the problem in many empirical papers in the OCA literature, our
findings are based on historical data sets that cannot be projected into the future.
Repeated experiments through time would be beneficial in terms of more fully
understanding the sensitivity of SAC to changing exchange rate regimes. And,
concerning regional monetary authority, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000)
emphasize that the credibility gains from a monetary union with an anchor country
cannot be extended to a region with no clear anchor. They point out that progress
in the credibility front should arise from peer control that facilitates the necessary
reforms (e.g., Mercosur has been effective in applying peer pressure to trade
policies). Furthermore, the common currency might work with no additional cost in
terms of giving up monetary sovereignty. Local monetary authorities could retain
their flexibility to fix interest rates and intervene in the international sovereign debt
markets in response to world shocks.16 A different issue is whether governments
of the member countries will have any incentive to choose not to inflate as a group.
This is an interesting issue that future research could address using a common
agency model approach (see, e.g., Dixit and Jensen 2003).
Figure 3 illustrates simulated outcomes for the individual Mercosur currencies
and Mercosur SAC. The implicit exchange rate series have been normalized using
the geometric mean formula in equation (6). Figure 4 illustrates simulated outcomes
for a 2-country, 3-country, and 4-country Mercosur SAC versus the historic USD/
YEN foreign exchange rate. Clearly, the Mercosur SAC is much more stable than
the constituent country currencies (including Chile). Interestingly, this result is
obtained despite the observed differences in terms of currency stability across the
sample of countries included in our simple exercise. Also, as the number of member
countries increases, the common currency is more stable.
16 As shown by Dixit and Jensen (2003), the final monetary rule bias will depend on the
incentive scheme reflected in the contracts between the member governments of the monetary
union and the common Central Bank.215 COMPUTING AND TESTING A STABLE COMMON CURRENCY FOR MERCOSUR COUNTRIES
Figure 3. Simulated Mercosur SAC compared to the normalized RNVal series
for each Mercosur country:  3/1994 - 6/2002
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Figure 4. Simulated 4-country Mercosur SAC (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
and Chile) versus 3-country Mercosur SAC (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay),
2-country Mercosur SAC (Argentina and Brazil), and the USD/YEN foreign
exchange rate:  3/1994 - 6/2002
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Finally, we seek to assess the willingness of each country to join the monetary
union. Consistent with our theoretical framework, this can be done by comparing
the first two statistical moments of the probability density functions of the reduced
normalized values of each Mercosur currency series relative to the implied Mercosur
SAC series. Table 4 shows that the standard deviation of the normalized Mercosur
SAC is about 20 (10) times lower than the normalized currency values for Argentina
and Brazil (Chile and Uruguay). The maximum expected annual depreciation of
Mercosur SAC is well below the 10 percent level, with a 0 percent probability of
observing an annual depreciation higher than 10 percent. Figure 5 illustrates in
terms of the probability density functions for each Mercosur currency and SAC.
In general, our results support the view that within the Mercosur region sufficient
ex ante incentives exist for constituent countries to join a monetary union.
Figure 5. Probability density functions of the implied Mercosur SAC
and the normalized RNVal series for each Mercosur country
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VI. Conclusion
This paper developed and demonstrated empirical methods to construct an ideal
common currency for mid-sized open economies with incomplete markets and
Mercosur countries in particular. As a theoretical foundation, we adopted an ISOLG
version of Neumeyer’s (1998) general equilibrium with incomplete markets model.
Regarding the analytical approach, we employed the currency invariant index and
stable aggregate currency (SAC) methods of Hovanov et al. (2004). The proposed
common currency is constructed as a derivative of an underlying dynamic portfolio
of securities that proxies the nominal exchange rates’ risk factors and floats against
the rest of the world currencies. We estimated implied currency series for Mercosur
countries for purposes of computing an implied Mercosur SAC. The resulting
optimal currency weights of the implied SAC were relatively balanced across
Mercosur countries, which suggests that such an optimal currency basket would
be subject to symmetric-collective control within the agency in charge of regional
monetary policy. The implied Mercosur SAC is considerably more stable than its
component currencies. Importantly, the Mercosur SAC could be used as the basis
for a single, common currency in the sense that its value could be tied to this
optimal currency basket. This empirical evidence can be interpreted to mean that
sufficient incentives exist to justify Mercosur countries’ adoption of a monetary
union, in line with arguments by Eichengreen (1998) and Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000).
We are aware that other regions of the world are contemplating the adoption of
a common basket currency. Asian and African countries have been discussing
their possible construction over the past decade. It is therefore likely that common
basket currencies will emerge at some point in the near future. The present paper
shows how to construct a single common currency with value tied to a minimum
variance currency basket for mid-sized open monetary economies and, therefore,
has important implications to emerging market countries.
Appendix. Data sources and definitions
The sample covers four Mercosur countries:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
We do not include Bolivia and Paraguay due to data limitations. Our sample
represents 100% of the region’s market capitalization, and more than 90% of its
economic activity measured in real GDP terms. The set of instrumental market
variables used in our analysis is as follows: 1) end- of-month official nominal JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 218
foreign exchange daily rates provided by the central banks of each country
(www.bcra.gov.ar and www.bcu.gub.uy); 2) annualized monthly short-term interest
rate differentials calculated in dollar terms as the log difference between the home
country short-term interbank bond equivalent yield (when the time series are
available, and 7-day call deposit rates otherwise) provided by the central banks of
each country and the equivalent U.S.dollar denominated LIBOR provided by the
Bank of England (www.bankofengland.w.uk); and 3) annualized monthly sovereign
credit spreads measured in basis points calculated from the J.P.Morgan Emerging
Market Bond Indices (EMBI+) provided by J.P.Morgan &
Co.Inc.(www2.jpmorgan.com/MarketDataInd/EMBI/). In the case of Uruguay, we
use sovereign spreads calculated from the Uruguay Bond Index (UBI) provided by
República AFAP (www.rafap.com). The hard currency SAC time series uses the
same currencies as in Hovanov et al.(2004). The sample covers the period from
January 1994 to June 2002. We excluded other relevant macroeconomic variables
due to the fact that they are not available on a monthly basis. While there is a vast
literature of exchange rate models that stresses the econometric significance of
macroeconomic variables, modeling the dynamics of exchange rates is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
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